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ABSTRACT
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are a major
problem in the Internet today. In one form of a DDoS at-
tack, a large number of compromised hosts send unwanted
traffic to the victim, thus exhausting the victim’s resources
and preventing it from serving its legitimate clients. One of
the main mechanisms that have been proposed to deal with
DDoS is filtering, which allows routers to selectively block
unwanted traffic. Given the magnitude of DDoS attacks
and the high cost of filters in the routers today, the suc-
cessful mitigation of a DDoS attack using filtering crucially
depends on the efficient allocation of filtering resources. In
this paper, we consider a single router, typically the victim’s
gateway, with a limited number of available filters. We study
how to optimally allocate filters to attack sources, or entire
domains of attack sources, so as to maximize the amount
of good traffic preserved, under a constraint on the num-
ber of filters. We formulate the problem as an optimization
problem and solve it optimally using dynamic programming,
study the properties of the optimal allocation, experiment
with a simple heuristic and evaluate our solutions for a range
of realistic attack-scenarios. First, we look at a single-tier
where the collateral damage is high due to the filtering at
the granularity of domains. Second, we look at the two-tier
problem where we have an additional constraint on the num-
ber of filters and the filtering is performed on the granularity
of attackers and domains.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) are one of the
most severe and hard to solve problems on the Internet to-
day. During a DDoS attack, a large number of compro-
mised hosts coordinate and send unwanted traffic to the vic-
tim thus exhausting the victim’s resources and preventing
it from serving its legitimate clients. For example, victims
of DDoS attacks can be companies that rely on the Internet
for their business, in which case DDoS attacks can result
in severe financial loss or even in the company quitting the
business [1]. Government sites (e.g. www1.whitehouse.gov)
and other organizations can also be victims of DDoS attacks,
in which case disruption of operation results in a political
or reputation cost.
Several approaches and mechanisms have been proposed to
deal with DDoS attacks; this is still an active research area
with ongoing work. One body of anti-DDoS work has fo-
cused on developing DDoS detection mechanisms: how to
quickly identify that an attack is ongoing, how to distinguish
the legitimate from the attack traffic, and how to identify the
paths where attack traffic is coming from. Another body of
work focuses on DDoS defense mechanisms to mitigate the
damage inflicted by a DDoS attack; defense mechanisms can
be proactive, such as capabilities [11] [10] and/or re-active,
such as filtering at the routers [8].
In this work, we are particularly interested in filtering mech-
anisms, which are a necessary component in the anti-DDoS
solution. We consider the scenario of a bandwidth flood-
ing attack, during which the bottleneck link to the victim
is flooded with undesired traffic. To defend against such
an attack, the victim must identify undesired traffic (using
some identification mechanism which is not the focus of this
work) and request from its ISP/gateway to block it before
it enters the victim’s access link and causes damage to le-
gitimate traffic. Even assuming a perfect mechanism for
identification of attack traffic, filter allocation at the vic-
tim’s gateway is in itself a hard problem. The reason is
that the number of attack sources in today’s DDoS attacks
is much larger than the number of expensive filters (ACLs)
at the routers. Therefore, the victim cannot afford to selec-
tively block traffic from each individual attack source, but
instead may have to block entire domains; in that case le-
gitimate traffic originating from that domain is also unnec-
essarily filtered together with the attack sources. Clearly,
the successful mitigation of a DDoS attack using filtering,
crucially depends on the allocation of filtering resources. In
this paper, we do not propose a new architectural solution to
DDoS. We study and optimize the use of an existing mech-
anism – filtering. Filters can be placed at a single gateways’
tier, so as to maximize the preserved good traffic; the core
insight in the single-tier problem is that the coarse filtering
granularity makes co-located attack and legitimate traffic
to share fate. This single-tier problem turned out to be a
knapsack problem, with a greedy solution [21].The insight
in the multi-tier problem is between the preserved goodput
and the number of filters used. In addition, we propose a
simple two-tier heuristic and we evaluate our solution for
three realistic attack scenarios, based on data sets from the
analysis of the Code Red [16] and Slammer [17] worms, the
Prolexic Zombie Report [19], and statistics on Internet users
[20].
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we give more background on the problem and we
discuss related work. In section 3, we formulate the prob-
lem of optimal filter allocation on a single tier (i.e. gateways
or attackers tier) and the more general problem of filtering
at both the gateway and attacker tier. We solve the prob-
lem optimally using dynamic programming. We study the
properties of the optimal solution and develop a low com-
plexity heuristic and compare its performance to that of the
optimal solution through simulation in section 4. In section
5, we conclude the paper and discuss open issues and future
work.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The DDoS Problem
There are several ways to launch DDoS attacks, which can
be mainly classified into the following types. First, there are
vulnerability attacks, when some vulnerability in the OS of
the targeted machine or in the network stack is exploited.
This causes the victim’s machine to crash once it receives
packets that exploit this vulnerability. In this paper, we
are not interested in this type of attack, because, once the
vulnerability is detected and patched, the victim is immune
to such attacks. Second, there are attacks that exploit a
protocol design vulnerability.1 Such attacks can be fixed
by modifying the existing protocols, and by having firewalls
check for adherence to protocol specifications; we are not
concerned with this type of attack either. The last type of
DDoS attacks aim at resource consumption. They exhaust
critical resources in the victim’s system such as CPU time,
memory or network bandwidth, thus causing the disruption
of legitimate service. In this paper, we are concerned with
a DDoS attack on network bandwidth, also called flooding
attack. A flooding attack is very easy to launch as it only
requires sending a certain amount of traffic that overwhelms
the link connecting the victim to the Internet. 2 An exam-
ple of flooding attack is shown in Fig. 1. A victim (V) is
connected to the Internet through ISP-V, using an access
link with bandwidth C. The victim is under a DDoS attack
from several attack sources hosted by other ISPs, such as
ISP-A. The total traffic coming from those sources exceeds
the total capacity C.
2.2 Filtering
Filtering is one of the mechanisms that can help to mitigate
DDoS attacks and stop the unwanted traffic from reaching
the victim and consuming network bandwidth along the way.
For example, in Fig.1, the victim can send a filtering request
to its own ISP-V to block all traffic from ISP-A to the victim.
ISP-V responds by placing filters at appropriately chosen
gateway(s), e.g. GW-V or GW-B. In this paper, we are not
concerned with choosing the best gateway within an ISP
1 An example is the well-known TCP three way handshake
protocol, which usually allocates resources on the server side
in the second step to the handshake. An attacker launches a
large number of uncompleted handshakes and overloads the
victim’s connection tables.
2It could also be a problem to ISPs or networks on the way
of the attack, but we are not concerned with these cases
because they generally are over provisioned
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Figure 1: The victim (V) is connected to its ISP
(ISP-V) through an access router (GW-V ) and an
access link (with bandwidth C). GW-B is a border
router of ISP-V. Attackers are located in various
ASes behind the attack gateways; the total traffic
exceeds the capacity C.
for placing the filters; instead we look at a single gateway,
say GW-V, and how to allocate filters to attackers or attack
domains.
By “filters”, we refer to access control lists (ACLs), which
allow a router to match a packet header against rules. E.g.
in the DDoS case described above, the router checks if the
packet is going to victim V and coming from attacking host
A; or the router might check the source IP address and filter
out any packet coming from the entire ISP-A. Packet filters
in routers are a scarce, expensive resource because they are
stored in the expensive TCAM (ternary content addressable
memory). A router linecard or supervisor-engine card typi-
cally supports a single TCAM chip with tens of thousands
of entries. So, depending on how an ISP connects its clients
to its network, each client can typically claim from a few
hundred to a few thousand filters – not enough to block the
attacks observed today and not nearly enough to block the
attacks expected in the near future. We formulate two fil-
tering problems: the single-tier and the two-tier filtering,
depending on the granularity of packet filtering (or equiv-
alently, the levels of the attack graph considered). In the
single-tier case, we are interested in filtering entire attack
gateways, a task for which there are enough filters today; in
this context, we seek to filter out traffic so that the total traf-
fic arriving at the victim is below the available bandwidth,
while maximizing the preserved legitimate traffic. In the
two-tier problem, we are interested in filtering not only at-
tack gateways but also individual attackers, a task for which
there are not enough filters in a single router today; the
number of filters becomes then an additional constraint.
2.3 Related Work
The DDoS problem has been an active research area in re-
cent years and different aspects have been addressed; a tax-
onomy of attacks and defense mechanisms can be found in
[2]. Here we review only aspects related to our work.
Our work relies on existing mechanisms to be able to identify
the attack traffic, distinguish it from the legitimate traffic
and trace its approximate path back to the attack source
[3]. The main difficulty in path identification lies in dealing
with source IP address spoofing. 3 Other mechanisms for
path identification and traceback include probabilistically
sending ICMP messages [5]; mechanisms based on hashing
[6] or packet marking [7].
In this work, we focus on filtering at a single router, typically
at the victim’s gateway. Looking at the bigger picture, sev-
eral mechanisms have been proposed to enable filter propa-
gation as close to the attack source a possible. For example,
Pushback [8] enables routers to propagate filtering upstream
hop-by-hop, at the router-level. AITF [9] proposes to com-
municate filtering information from the victim upstream to-
wards the attack domain, but at the granularity of AS, as
opposed to router.
Filtering is not the only mechanism for mitigation of DDoS
attacks. Some of the proposed approaches revisit the basic
assumption of the Internet architecture, stating that every
host can send to any other host, without requiring permis-
sion of the receiving host. For example, capabilities which
propose that tokens are obtained before establishing a con-
nection with a destination, and that these token are in-
cluded in each packet [10][11] [12] This proposal requires
changing the routers on the Internet and adding new servers
and changes the whole Internet architecture. Other pro-
posals use overlay mechanisms to implement a similar con-
cept which is to restrict communication to the victim only
through some known well provisioned overlay nodes which
can filter and detect attacks [13] [14].
Using filtering could provide a quick solution or first line
of defense to DoS attacks, until a permanent one is devel-
oped and is already used today in commercially available
systems and anti-DoS services [15]. The downside of filter-
ing is that its performance heavily depends on being able
to identify attack traffic and distinguish it from legitimate
traffic, which is not an easy task. However, it is an avail-
able, reactive mechanism that can be used in conjunction
with other approaches.
Finally, in this paper, we rely upon data from analysis of
worms, to construct realistic attack scenarios. Internet worms
are older than DDoS attacks, but are relevant for studying
such attacks because they are used as a tool to infect and
compromise hosts on the Internet with the attack clients.
The Code Red [16] worm is one well-known worm from 2001,
which contained code to launch a DoS attack on the website
(www1.whitehouse.gov), which did not succeed. Recently,
several other worms have been caused huge financial losses,
such as Slammer [17], MyDoom, Flash worms [18] and others
and have attracted a lot of researcher’s attention. Prolexic
[15] is also regularly publishing a very informative ”Zombie
Report”, on the most infected hosts per country, network
service-provider and other meaningful groupings [19]; these
data are collected from actually launched DDoS attacks. A
3Because ingress filtering [4] is not widely adopted, it is
easy to spoof the source IP address of any packet. However,
most attack tools do not need to spoof, because of the large
number of attackers, it is useless to spoof.
detailed characterization of DDoS attacks is much needed as
input for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of proposed
solutions.
3. FORMULATION OF OPTIMAL ALLO-
CATION OF FILTERS
3.1 General Discussion
In general, one might consider allocating filters at any level
of the attack graph, see Fig.1. There is clearly a trade off
between filtering granularity (to maximize goodput) and the
number of filters. If there were no constraints on the number
of filters, the maximum throughput of good traffic (goodput)
would be achieved by allocating filters as close to individ-
ual attackers as possible. The gateway in question (GW-V)
faces the following tradeoff. Ideally, GW-V would like to
filter out all attackers and allow all good traffic to reach the
victim. Unfortunately, in a typical DDoS attack, there are
not enough filters to individually filter all IP addresses of
attack hosts. A solution is to aggregate attack sources into
a single filter; in practice, there are enough filters available
to filter at that granularity. E.g. GW-V could summarize
several attack sources coming from the same domain, e.g.
behind GW-1, into a single rule and filter out the entire do-
mains, as shown in Fig. 2. However, there is also legitimate
traffic coming from each domain. Therefore, filtering at the
granularity of attack gateway-tier causes “collateral” dam-
age to legitimate traffic that falls into the range of the IP
addresses described by the filter. This problem, referred to
as the ”single-tier filtering”, is studied in section 3.2 so as
to preserve the maximum amount of legitimate traffic while
meeting the capacity constraint. This turns out to be a
knapsack problem that can be solved by a greedy algorithm
(shown in Algorithm 1).
In practice, there are more filters (F ) than attack gate-
ways (N < F ), but less filters than individual attackers
(F <
PN
i=1
Mi) (see Fig. 3). Filtering at the gateway level
is feasible but causes the collateral damage discussed above,
due to its coarse granularity. Filtering at the attacker’s level
would preserve the maximum possible throughput but it is
not realistic (due to the high number of attackers as well
as due to spoofing); we still consider it as an upper bound
for performance. A practical and effective compromise be-
tween the two extremes can be the two-tier filtering, shown
in Fig. 3. In the two-tier filtering, we can choose to filter
either at gateways’ granularity (e.g. filter 1 in Fig. 3) or at
attackers’ granularity (e.g. filter 2 in Fig. 3). The optimal
allocation of filters to individual attack sources, or to entire
attack gateways, depends on the characteristics of the at-
tack (distribution and intensity) as well as on the number
of available filters. Furthermore, the successful containment
of the DDoS attack crucially depends on the optimization
of the filter allocation.
3.2 Single-Tier Allocation
The single-tier scenario is shown in Fig.2. There are N at-
tacking gateways, each generating both good (Gi) and bad
(Bi) traffic toward the victim; the total traffic toward the
victim exceeds its capacity C. Gateway GW-V allocates fil-
ters to block the attack traffic towards V. There are enough
filters to allocate to the N gateways. The objective is to
allocate filters to limit the total traffic below the available
Gateways’
Tier
G1
GW1 . . . . c
V
C
GWV
GWi GWN
filter 
B1 Gi Bi GN BN
Figure 2: Single-Tier Filtering Problem
capacity, so as to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic
that is getting through to the victim (because this is what
the victim cares about, e.g. revenue for a web server).
Let us use xi = 1 and xi = 0 to indicate whether we allow
or block all traffic from gateway i. The problem of optimal
allocation of filters is to choose {xi}
N
i :
max
P
Gi · xiP
(Gi +Bi) · xi
s.t.
i=NX
i=1
(Gi +Bi) · xi ≤ C
and xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, ..N
(1)
We noticed that the filter allocation problem is essentially
a 0-1 knapsack problem [21]. Recall that in the knapsack
problem, we choose some among N objects, each with profit
vi and a weight wi, so as to maximize the total profit, sub-
ject to a total weight constraint. In our case, the objects
are the attacking nodes with profits and weights Gi and
Gi + Bi respectively; and there is a constraint C on the
victim’s bandwidth. This is well-known to be a computa-
tionally hard problem. However, we need computationally
efficient solutions, because the filter allocation should be de-
cided in real-time during the attack.
The continuous relaxation of the problem (where x is no
longer binary, but instead 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1) can be interpreted as
placing rate-limiters: we allow ratio xi of the traffic coming
from node i to get to the victim. This corresponds to the
fractional knapsack problem, which can be solved optimally
using a greedy algorithm [21]. The algorithm in Algorithm
1, shown below, sorts nodes in a decreasing order of effi-
ciency
Gj
Gj+Bj
,4 and greedily accepts (xi = 1) nodes with the
maximum efficiency, until a critical node c, which if allowed
will exceed the capacity. Traffic from all remaining nodes is
4 Technically, maximizing
P Gi
Gi+Bi
is not the same as max-
imizing
P
Gi. However because the optimal solution hasP
Gi +Bi ≃ C, it is the same in practice.
filtered out (xi = 0) and installs a rate-limiter to the crit-
ical element (xc =
C−
Pj=c−1
j=1
Gj+Bj
Gc+Bc
) to use the remaining
capacity. This requires only O(nlogn) steps for sorting and
O(n) for filer/rate-limiters allocation.
Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm for the Single-Tier.
• Order nodes in decreasing order
Gj
Gj+Bj
. W.l.o.g. j =
1, 2, ..N from largest to smallest efficiency.
• Find the critical node c s.t.:
Pj=c−1
j=1
Gj +Bj < C andPj=c
j=1
Gj +Bj > C
• Allocate filters to nodes i = 1, 2, ...N as follows:
– xj = 1 for j = 1, 2, ..c− 1 (allow to pass)
– xc =
C−
Pj=c−1
j=1
Gj+Bj
Gc+Bc
(rate limiter)
– xj = 0 for j = c+ 1, ..n (filters)
Notice, that it is impractical to allocate rate-limiters to
all attacking nodes, because rate-limiters are expensive re-
sources and require keeping state. Fortunately, the opti-
mal solution of the fractional problem turned out to be
(x1, ...xc−1, xc, xc+1, ..., xN) = (1, ...1, xc−1, 0, ...0), thus us-
ing C−1 filters and exactly one rate-limiter, which matches
well current router resources. 5
3.3 Two-Tier Allocation
The two-tier problem is the following. Consider N attack
gateways and Mi attack hosts behind attack gateway i, i.e.
the last two tiers in Fig.1. Each attacker contributes both
good (Gij) and bad traffic (Bij), i = 1, 2..N, j = 1, 2...Mj .
xij ∈ 0, 1 depending on whether we allocate a filter to
attack-host j behind gateway i. xi ∈ 0, 1 depending on
whether we allocate a filter to attack-gateway i; if xi = 0,
then all traffic originating behind GW-i is blocked, and there
is no need to allocate additional filters to attackers (i, j), j =
1, 2, ...Mi.
The problem is how to choose {xi}’s, {xij}’s, given the con-
straints C on the victim’s capacity and on the available num-
ber of filters F at the gateway:
max
X
Gij · xi · xij
s.t.
i=NX
i=1
j=MiX
j=1
(Gij +Bij) · xi · xij ≤ C
X
(1− xi) +
X
(1− xij) ≤ F
where xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, ..N
and xij ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 2...,Mj
(2)
The two-tier problem is harder than the single-tier one: it
is a variation of the cardinality-constrained knapsack [21],
and the optimal solution (in O(NMF )) cannot be found
5If only filters are allowed, we can choose xc = 0 so that the
total traffic does not violate the capacity constraint of the
congested link.
Gateways’
Tier
G1
GW1 . . . . c
V
C
GWV
GWi GWN
filter 1 
…
b11 b1M1
… bi1 b1Mi
…
…Gi
Attackers’
Tier
filter 2 
Figure 3: Two-Tiers Filtering Problem
efficiently. We formulate the problem using dynamic pro-
gramming and obtain its optimum solution as a base line
for comparison, but we point out that the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm is computationally very expensive and
can not be used in real time.
Definitions. Consider the two-tiers configurations, shown
in Fig. 3. There are N gateways. A gateway n gener-
ates legitimate traffic Gn and also attack traffic from Mn
attack sources; w.l.o.g. consider that the attacker sources
are ordered from worst to best: b(n, 1) > ... > b(n,Mn).
Therefore, each gateway generates total traffic Cn = Gn +PMn
i=1
b(n, i). Before filtering, the total traffic exceeds the
victim’s access bandwidth (capacity) C:
PN
i=1
Cn > C. We
are interested in placing F filters across the N gateways, so
as to bring the total traffic below C, while maximizing the
total goodput after filtering TN (C,F ). T
∗
N(C,F ), can be
computed recursively as summarized in Algorithm 2. The
recursion proceeds considering one more gateway at a time;
the order in which gateways are considered is not impor-
tant. Let T ∗i (c, f), for i ≤ N , be the maximum goodput of
the smaller problem, i.e. with optimal placement of f ≤ F
filters considering only gateways {1, 2, ..i} and capacity up
to c ≤ C. Assume that, in previous steps, we have already
obtained and stored the optimal solutions Ti(c, f) consider-
ing only gateways 1, 2, ...n − 1, for all values of c = 0, 1, ..C
and f = 0, 1, ...F . Then T ∗n(c, f) can be computed from the
Bellman recursive equation:
T ∗n(c, f) = max
x=0,1,..f
T ∗n−1(c− (Cn −
j=xX
j=0
b(n, j)), f − x) +Gn
(3)
This recursive equation is at the heart of Alg.2 (see line 23).
Intuition. In step n, we consider gateway n together with
the previous gateways 1, 2, ...n − 1. The f available filters
can be split among two groups of gateways: {1, 2, ..n − 1}
and {n}; x ≤ f filters are assigned to the new gateway
n and the remaining f − x filters are assigned to the pre-
vious gateways {1, 2, ..n − 1}. The x filters assigned to
GWn are used to block the x worst attackers. Therefore,Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x) bad traffic is blocked and the remaining C(n)−Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x) = Gn +
Pj=Mn
j=x+1
b(n, x) traffic goes through
(gwnunfiltered in line 24), consuming part of the total ca-
pacity c. The remaining f − x filters are optimally assigned
to gateways 1, 2, ...n−1. Recall that we have previously ob-
tained and stored the optimal solutions T ∗n−1(c, f) consider-
ing only gateways {1, 2, ...n − 1}, for all c and f ; therefore,
we already know the best allocation of f − x filters across
gateways {1, 2, ...n− 1} so as to get the maximum goodput
T ∗n−1(c− (C(n)−
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)), f − x).
We consider all possible values of x and choose the value
among 0 ≤ x ≤ f that gives the maximum goodput (line 33
in Alg.2). There are some values of x that deserve special
attention:
• x = 0 means that we assign no filters to gateway n,
in which case our best goodput is the same as be-
fore, enhanced by the goodput of the current gateway:
T ∗n−1(c− Cn, f) +Gn (max0 in line 12 of Alg. 2).
• x = 1 means that we assign exactly one filter to gate-
way n, either at attacker or at gateway level. If we
assign this one filter to an attacker, it should be the
worst attacker b(n, 1) (line 16 in Alg.2). If this one
filter is assigned to the entire gateway, then the entire
traffic Cn from gateway n is filtered out and all good-
put comes from the previous gateways T ∗n−1(c, f − 1)
(see line 18 of Alg.2). We need to compare the two
possibilities and choose the one that maximizes the
overall goodput (max1 in line 19 of Alg.2).
• We consider increasing values of x until we either run
out of filters (x = f) or we filter out all attackers in
this gateway (x = Mn). Therefore, x can increase up
to min{f,Mn} (line 23 in Alg. 2).
Other technicalities in Algorithm 2 include the obvious ini-
tializations (lines 1-3) and assigning T ∗ = 0 to infeasible
problems (line 3-2nd case and line 28).
Optimal Substructure. The reason that we are able to com-
pute the optimal solution using dynamic programming (DP)
is because the problem exhibits the optimal substructure
property.
Proposition. If a∗ is the optimal solution for problem
(n, c, f), then it contains a part a∗{1,...n−1} ⊂ a
∗ (correspond-
ing to the filters assigned to the first n-1 gateways) which
must also be the optimal solution for the smaller problem
(n− 1, C − (Cn −
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)), f − x).
Proof. a∗ is the optimal solution for problem (n, c, f),
achieving maximum goodput T ∗n(c, f).
6 This solution (filter
6a∗ will have the form of a vector (1, 0, 0, ..., 0, 1); 0/1 de-
scribes whether an attacker or gateway has been filtered out
or not; the attackers and gateways should be listed in the
same order they are considered in the DP.
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Programming (DP) Formulation for
the Two-Tiers Filtering Problem
1: for n = 1, 2, ..N do
2: T ∗n(c = 0, :) = 0
3: T ∗n(:, f = 0) =
(PN
n=1 Gn if
PN
n=1 Gn < C
0 otherwise
4: end for
5:
6: for n ∈ [1, N ] do
7: for c ∈ [1, C] do
8: for f ∈ [1, F ] do
9: /* x out of f filters are assigned to GWn */
10:
11: /* assign x = 0 filters to GWn*/
12: max0 = T ∗n−1(c− Cn, f) +Gn
13:
14: /*assign x = 1 filter to GWn*/
15: /* ...either at gateway level*/
16: max1gw = T
∗
n−1(c, f − 1)
17: /* ...or at attacker level*/
18: max1att = T
∗
n−1(c− (Cn − b(n, 1)), f − 1) +Gn
19: max1 = max{max1gw, max1att}
20: max = max{max0,max1}
21:
22: /* assign x ≥ 2 filters at attack level. */
23: for x ∈ [2, min(f,Mn)] do
24: gwnunfiltered := Cn −
Px
j=1
b(n, j)
25: if c > gwnunfiltered then
26: temp := Tn−1∗(c−gwnunfiltered, f−x)+Gn
27: else
28: temp := 0
29: end if
30: if temp > max then
31: max := temp
32: end if
33: T ∗n(c, f) := max
34: end for
35: end for
36: end for
37: end for
assignment) must have two parts a∗ = (a∗{1,2..n−1}, a
∗
{n}).
The first part, a∗{1,2..n−1}
7, describes how filters are placed
across gateways {1, 2, ..n − 1}. The second part, a{n}
8 de-
scribes how filters are assigned to gateway {n} only. Let’s
look carefully at the optimal solution a∗: it assigns some
number of filters (x) to gateway n and the remaining ones
(f−x) to gateways {0, 1, ..n−1}. This means that
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)
out of Cn traffic is filtered out at gateway n and the re-
maining Cn −
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x) is left unfiltered. In summary,
the optimal solution can be partitioned in two parts a∗ =
(a∗{1,2..n−1}, a
∗
{n}) that contribute to the maximum through-
put:
T ∗n(c, f) := T
˛˛
a∗
= T
˛˛˛
a∗
{1,2..n−1}
+ T
˛˛˛
a∗
{n}
Assume that b, and not a∗{1,2..n−1}, is the optimal filter as-
7a vector (1, 0, 0, ...) starting from the left of vector a∗
8the remaining part at the right side of vector a∗
signment for the smaller problem (n−1, C−(Cn−
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)), f−
x). Then, by definition, of the optimal filtering, it achieves
larger goodput than the substructure a∗{1,2..n−1} ⊂ a
∗: T ∗n−1 :=
T
˛˛
b
> T
˛˛
a∗
{1,2..n−1}
.
Now, we can construct another solution d for the larger prob-
lem (n, c, f) as follows. Replace the first part a{1,2..n−1} of
a∗ with b, for assigning f − x filters up to gateway n − 1,
which would fit within capacity C − (Cn −
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)).
Then, do exactly the same assignment as the DP would do,
in Eq. 3, for assigning the x remaining filters to gateway
n. This newly constructed filter assignment d has two parts
d = (b, d{n}) that contribute to the total goodput.
The first part b is over gateways {1, 2, ..n − 1}. We con-
structed this part to be the same as the optimal assignment
of f − x filters over gateways {1, 2, ..n − 1}, with available
capacity C − (Cn−
Pj=x
j=0
b(n, x)). Therefore it achieves op-
timal goodput T
˛˛
b
:= T ∗n−1 ≥ T
˛˛
a∗
{1,2..n−1}
.
The second part d2 is an assignment over only gateway {n}.
We constructed it to do exactly what the DP would do at
step n with x available filters: either filter out the worst
x attackers of gateway n (i.e. attackers b(n, 1)...b(1, x)) or
filter out the entire gateway (if x = 1 is assigned at gateway
level). Therefore, d2 is by construction is the exact same
assignment as the DP’s: d2 = a{n}∗ and results in the same
goodput: T
˛˛
d2
= T
˛˛
a∗
{n}
.
Therefore, we constructed a solution d = (b, d2) which per-
forms better than the DP solution a∗:
T
˛˛˛
d
= T
˛˛˛
b
+ T
˛˛
d{n}
> T
˛˛˛
a∗
{1,2..n−1}
+ T
˛˛
a∗
{n}
= T
˛˛˛
a∗
(4)
This is a contradiction because we assumed that a∗ was an
optimal solution for the bigger problem (n, c, f). Therefore
the substructure a∗{1,...n−1} of the optimal solution a
∗ has
to be the optimal solution for the smaller problem.
Cost of the Dynamic Programming. Computing the optimal
solution value T ∗n(C,F ) using dynamic programming (DP)
can be seen as filling up a table of size N · C · F . For real-
istic large values of N , C, F this can be prohibitively large,
both from a run-time and from a memory point of view.
While the number of gateways N can be moderate, the ca-
pacity C (normalized in units of the smallest attack rate)
and F (in the order of thousands or tens of thousands) can
be quite large in practice. An idea might be to work with
coarser increments of C and F - which brings us already
in the realm of heuristics for the DP, which we need to ex-
plore anyway. Nevertheless, computing the optimal solution
is still important as a benchmark for evaluation of any pro-
posed heuristic.
3.3.1 Properties of the Optimal Solution
From the simulations of the dynamic programming, in sec-
tion 4.4, we made the following preliminary observations on
the behavior of the optimal solution.
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Figure 4: Improvement from using optimal filtering
for various attack intensities (% of attacking nodes,
B/(G + B)). We consider n = 1000 attacking nodes,
all sending at the same rate (10Mbps).
Comparison to single-tier filtering. Let TN (C, f), GN(C, f),
AN (C, f) be the maximum goodput achieved by the optimal
placement of f filters across N gateways, considering multi-
tier placement, single-tier placement at gateways and single
attackers respectively. Given the same attack scenario:
• TN (C, f) ≥ AN(C, f) and TN (C, f) ≥ GN (C, f). This
is expected, because by definition, the optimal solution
of the multi-tier problem considers placing all filters at
gateway and attack level, as special cases.
• G∗ < T < A∗ where: G∗ is the optimal filtering for
single gateway tier and A∗ is the optimal filtering for
the single attack level filtering. Single tier filtering
does not have a constraint on the number of filters
and is only constrained by the “collateral damage” on
legitimate traffic.
• As f ↑, T converges to A∗, the optimal solution for at-
tacker’s single tier, without a constraint on the number
of filters.
A preliminary note. The core tradeoff when we consider
filtering a single gateway is whether we should filter it out
entirely (thus filtering out both Gi and Bi) or we should use
a certain number of filters f at attack-tier. How many filters,
out of our total budget, does it worth spending on a gateway
with traffic (Gi, b(i, 1), ...(b, n))? Looking at the structure
of the optimal solution, it seems to follow a threshold rule
for deciding whether to filter out an entire gateway or not.
This threshold depends on the attack distribution and on
the number of available filters. We are currently working on
formalizing this informal, but intuitive, observation.
4. SIMULATIONS
4.1 Single-Tier Artificially Generated Scenar-
ios
We systematically considered a wide range of scenarios and
here we showcase some representative results. Let us fix the
number N of attack nodes; we considered N = 10, 100, 1000.
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Figure 5: Improvement from using optimal filtering
for various % of nodes with high intensity, and var-
ious % of nodes sending at higher rate (100Mbps).
H = 0.9 is fixed for all attacking nodes.
Let us control the intensity of the attack through a simple
model with three parameters. (i) the bandwidth at which
each node sends is a configurable parameter. (ii) x% of the
nodes that are attacking and the remaining (100-x)% send
legitimate traffic (iii) attacking nodes have all the same bad-
to-overall traffic ratio H = B
B+G
; the legitimate nodes have
ratio 1−H of bad to overall.
Fig.4 shows the results for N = 1000 nodes, which all send
at the same rate (10Mbps). We consider all combinations
of x ∈ {0, 100}% and H ∈ (0.5, 0.9) and we look at the
difference in the % of good traffic on the congested link,
before and after optimal filtering. The figure shows that
there is always improvement, with the best improvement
(40%) achieved when 50% of all nodes are attackers, sending
at H = B
B+G
= 0.9.
Then, we also vary the sending rate of each node. We ran-
domly pick 10%, 50% or 90% of the nodes to have 10 times
more bandwidth than the rest (i.e. 100Mbps). The reason
we look at heterogeneous bandwidths is that a node should
be filtered based not only on the ratio B
B+G
, but also on its
total contribution B + G to the capacity of the congested
link. Fig.5, shows that optimal filtering significantly helps
in this case.
4.1.1 Varying the number of attacking nodes
In this section, we increase the number of nodes and we are
interested not only in the % of good traffic preserved, but
also in the number of filters required. We compare optimal
filtering to 3 benchmark policies:
• Uniform rate limiting: rate-limit all nodes by C
total traffic
,
to make sure the total traffic does not exceed the ca-
pacity. Notice, that this policy is equivalent to no fil-
tering in terms of percentage of good to overall traffic
on the congested link.
• Random filtering: randomly place the same number of
filters as the optimal policy.
• Max-min rate limiting: admit the low-rate nodes first
while allocating the same bandwidth to the high rate
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Figure 6: Performance of Optimal Filtering for the
attackers’ one tier.
ones; then distribute the excess capacity fairly among
the unsatisfied remaining nodes.9
We vary the number of attackers (from 1000 to 50000) and
we allocate filters to individual attackers (attackers’ one-tier
problem )10. In Fig6, optimal filtering clearly outperforms
the other policies: it preserves more good traffic using less
filters. However, the number of filters increases linearly with
the number of attackers, which clearly does not scale for a
large number of attackers.
To deal with this scalability issue, we solve the one-tier prob-
lem at the gateway level. We consider again an increasing
number of attackers (from 1000 to 50000), but this time
attackers are evenly spread behind n = 1000 gateways (as
in Fig. 1) and we allocate filters to gateways, not to in-
dividual attackers. The results are shown in Fig. 7. The
9The motivation is to do a more informed rate limiting than
the uniform rate-limiting, and also to be friendly to the
nodes that emit at lower rates.
10In this simulation scenario, we vary N , but we make sure
that the total good traffic is below the capacity (in particularPN
1
Gi =
C
2
), because this is the practical case of adequate
provisioning. To construct such an assignment, we assign C
2
over half of the nodes assigning C
N
to every other node and
we randomly pick N/2 nodes and assign them bad traffic.
We make sure that the total traffic emitted by each node is
no more than its maximum rate (32, 64, or 128 kbps)
Table 1: Code-Red Scenarios
Code Red I Code Red II
Country GW % of % of % of % of
Good Bad Good Bad
Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic
from [20] from [16]
USA 1 36.27 43.9 36.2 45.9
Korea 2 5.8 11.5 0 12
China 3 18.35 10.3 24.1 0
Taiwan 4 2.46 6.1 2.4 16.7
Canada 5 3.64 5.4 3.6 5.4
UK 6 6.74 5.2 6.7 5.3
Germany 7 8.4 5.1 8.4 5.2
Australia 8 2.5 4.3 2.5 1.1
Japan 9 13.91 4.2 14.2 0
Netherlands 10 1.93 4.1 1.9 8.4
optimal policy again outperforms the others: it preserves
significantly more good traffic while using much less filters.
However, there are several differences from filtering at the
attackers’ tier, all due to the coarser filtering granularity.
First, we need less filters, but the % of preserved traffic
drops below 50% in the case of larger number of attackers.
Second, the number of filters used by the optimal policy in-
creases fast up to around 90% and then saturates, because
otherwise all traffic would be blocked. Third, the max-min
policy performs much worse now; also from a practical point
of view, the uniform and max-min policies are less attrac-
tive, because they use rate-limiters on all nodes, which is
unrealistic.
4.2 Realistic Attack Scenarios
First, we used data from the analysis of two recent worms,
Code-Red [16] and Slammer [17] to construct realistic attack
distributions as in the single-tier section. Another source of
data we used for the attack traffic distribution is Zombie
Report [19] published by Prolexic [15]. This report contains
the percentage of bots, grouped per country, network, ISP
and other meaningful groupings; we use the data referring to
the number of infected hosts per country. We assume that
if a victim is under attack that traffic would come from ten
countries. We consider the ten first countries and assume
that they are behind ten different gateways11. The distri-
bution of attack traffic for the Code-Red, Slammer Zombie
scenario is summarized in the last column of Tables 1, 2 and
3.
We consider a typical victim – a web-server with 100Mbps
access link. We also consider that each country is in a dif-
ferent AS, thus is behind a different gateway; we then use
the number of attack sources per gateway, as reported in
[16, 17, 19] 12 and shown in the 4th column of Table 1.
For the legitimate traffic, we use the breakdown of Inter-
net users per country reported in [20] and shown in the 3rd
column of Table 1, 2 and ??. We consider that both at-
tackers and legitimate users send at the same rate (32kbps,
11note that the first ten countries sum up to be 65% so we
distribute the rest of the 35% of the attack traffic uniformly
on these countries
12In [16] 80% of the total attack comes from 10 countries; we
distributed the rest 20% of the attack uniformly across the
lower 8 countries.
Table 2: Slammer Scenario: attack launched by a
population of hosts infected by a worm similar to
Slammer.
Country GW % Good Traffic % Bad Traffic
USA 1 36.3% 44.6%
South Korea 2 5.8% 13.6%
China 3 18.5% 8%
Taiwan 4 2.4% 5.7%
Canada 5 3.6% 4.6%
Australia 6 2.5% 4.2%
UK 7 6.7% 3.8%
Japan 8 13.9% 3.5%
Netherlands 9 1.9 % 3.3%
Unknown 10 8.4% 8.7%
Total 100% 100%
Table 3: Prolexic Scenario: attack launched by a
bots population, similar to the one in the Prolexic
Zombie Report.
Country GW % Good Traffic % Bad Traffic
US 1 36.5% 21.5%
China 2 18.5% 14.5%
Germany 3 8.5 % 13.5%
UK 4 6.78% 8.5%
France 5 4.59% 8.5%
Brazil 6 4% 7.5%
Japan 7 13.99% 7.5%
Phillippines 8 1.4% 6.5%
Russia 9 13.94% 6.5%
Malaysia 10 1.8% 5.5%
Total 100% 100%
64kbps or 128kbps), corresponding to upstream dialup/dsl.
Therefore, if the total number of legitimate users is N and
that of attackers is M , then the amount of good and bad
traffic coming from gateway i is Gi = N · (% users behind
gateway i) · (rate) and Bi = M · (% users behind gateway
i) · (rate). Our rationale is that the number of legitimate
users is representative of the legitimate traffic coming from
each country. We use the number/percentage of legitimate
users, to compute the % of total good traffic generated by
each gateway. The result is summarized in the third column
in each attack scenario.
In summary, we construct 3 realistic attack scenarios using
data from [20] for the good traffic and from the analysis of
code-red worm, slammer worm and in the Prolexic report
for the bad traffic. The attack scenarios for the CodeRed,
Slammer and Prolexic are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
4.3 Results For Single-Tier
We simulated the Code-Red scenario, (CodeRed I – columns
3 and 4 of Table 1) for a number of legitimate users N from
1000 to 10000 and attackers M from 1000 to 10000, and we
compared the amount of good traffic preserved without any
filtering and with optimal filtering. The results are shown
in Fig. 8 for 32Kbps sending rate. (The results for 64kbps
and 128kbps show similar trends and are omitted here).
Fig. 8(a) shows the % of good traffic preserved. When the
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Figure 7: Performance of Optimal Filtering for the
gateways’ one tier (1000 gateways, same number of
attackers behind each gateway).
total good traffic is less than the capacity of the congested
link,13 and the number of attackers was between 1000 and
2000, optimal filtering preserves 100% of the good traffic.
As the number of attackers increases, the % of good traffic
preserved drops; e.g. for 1000 users and 10000 attackers,
optimal filtering preserves 55% of the good traffic. This is
because filtering at the gateway level is as if it is based on
destination address or source address with granularity of do-
mains; better results could be achieved if a finer granularity
of filtering could be applied (i.e. source address of individual
attackers), as in the multi-tier case later.
Fig. 8(b) shows the % of the capacity of the congested link
that consists of good traffic. When the number of attackers
is comparable to the number of legitimate users (e.g. 10000
attackers and 10000 users), we observe that the optimal fil-
tering preserves 25% more good traffic, which increases the
percentage of good traffic on the congested link from 50%
to 75%. However, at the extremes where the number of le-
gitimate users is much smaller (e.g. 1000 users and 10000
attackers) or much larger (e.g. 10000 users and 1000 attack-
13When the good traffic exceeds the capacity, we cannot pre-
serve 100% of good traffic any way. This can be seen as a
combination of a flash-crowd and DoS attack. In the rest
of the paper, we focus on cases where the good traffic does
not exceed the capacity of the link (which is the case with
normal operation and good provisioning).
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Figure 8: Performance of Optimal Filtering for sce-
nario Code Red I.
ers) than the number of attackers then the optimal filtering
increases the preserved good traffic only marginally ( 10%).
The improvement achieved above was moderate, because all
gateways had both good and bad traffic. If there are gate-
ways that carry only good or bad traffic, then filtering would
be able to better separate good from bad traffic and further
improve performance. To demonstrate this, we modify the
distributions of good and bad traffic per gateway, as shown
in scenario Code Red II – 5th and 6th column of Table 1. This
modification maps to real life scenarios in which a certain
website has only customers in some, but not all, countries
(ASs). Also it is reasonable to assume that the attacker will
not be able to compromise hosts in ASes that span all coun-
tries, thus there are some gateways with only bad or good
traffic.
We used the same simulation setup as for the Code-Red I
scenario and the results are shown in Fig. 9. The trends
are similar but the improvement is more substantial: the %
of the capacity of the congested link used by good traffic
improves up to 50% with optimal filtering. In the case of
10000 legitimate users, optimal filtering allows only good
traffic through the congested link until the capacity is used.
The same behavior can be observed for 5000 legitimate users
with 64Kbps and 128Kbps rates.
4.4 Results For Two-Tier
Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the performance of the optimal
two-tier filtering for the Code-Red scenario, the Slammer
scenario and the Zombie scenario respectively. In all three
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Figure 9: Performance of Optimal Filtering for sce-
nario Code Red II.
cases, we increase the number of attackers14 and we look at
how well filtering can handle the increasing attack traffic.
The performance metrics of interest are (a) the % goodput
preserved after filtering and (b) the number of filters used in
the process. As a baseline for comparison, we also show the
performance of the optimal single-tier filtering at gateway
and attack level.
In all three figures, the optimal solution performs very sim-
ilarly; although they are based on different distributions of
good and bad traffic. As expected, filtering at attackers’
level (plain red line) gives the upper bound for the preserved
goodput. Indeed, one can preserved 100 % of the good traf-
fic by filtering out each individual attacker15 but requires as
many filters as the number of attackers, which is not fea-
sible in practice. Filtering at the gateway level (shown in
dashed green line) provides a lower bound to the preserved
goodput (because it filters out together both good and bad
traffic behind the same gateway) but uses a small number of
filters. Multi-tier filtering lies in the middle (blue curves in
the middle): it provides a graceful degradation of preserved
goodput, using only a small number of filters. The larger the
number of filters available for multi-tier filtering, the closer
the preserved goodput will be to the upper bound.
In the previous simulations, we increased the number of at-
14Because the computation of the optimal solution through
DP was computationally intense, we consider a relatively
small number of k and n in order for the simulations to
complete.
15assuming there are no hosts that produce both good and
bad traffic
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Figure 10: Performance of the Optimal Multi-tier
Filtering for the CodeRed scenario.
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Figure 11: Performance of the Optimal Multi-tier
Filtering for the Slammer scenario.
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Figure 12: Performance of the Optimal Multi-tier
Filtering for the Zombie scenario.
tackers but kept the number of legitimate users fixed. The
total goodput was kept constant and below the capacity,
that is why it was possible to preserve up to 100% of it. We
now increase the amount of good traffic together with the
number of bad traffic, so it is still consistent with the Zombie
scenario in Table 1.16 In practice, such a scenario captures
a combination of DDoS attack and a Flash Crowd. The re-
sults are shown in Fig.13. One can notice that while the
good traffic is still below capacity, the curves are flat, mean-
ing that we can preserve the good traffic. After the point
that the good traffic exceeds the capacity, the performance
degrades gracefully.
4.4.1 Two-Tier Heuristic (H1)
As a quick test, we tried the simple heuristic shown in Alg.3.
It operates in two separate steps. In the first step, it assigns
all filters optimally to the attackers-tier only. This may
require f∗att > F . In the second step, we try to correct that
by filtering out (thus releasing filters) the gateways with the
least amount of good traffic.
This heuristic is a very simple, two-step heuristic, which
performed reasonably for the scenarios we tried. Clearly,
there is much room for improvement and fine tuning, and
this is the direction we are currently working on.
In this section we present some preliminary simulations of
16In particular, we increase the number of nodes at attackers
tier and we assume that each node emits both good and bad
traffic.
Algorithm 3 Multi-tier Heuristic
1: Assign filters optimally at attacks’ single tier. /* This
may require a number of filters f∗att larger than the avail-
able F*/
2: Order gateways in decreasing amount of good traffic G.
3: Allow gateways in a greedy way, i.e. from larger to
smaller G, until you reach the maximum number of
available filters F (Keep the filter assignment at their
attackers as assigned at the first step.).
4: Filter out all remaining gateways.
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of Attackers (and legitimate users)
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 P
re
se
rv
ed
 G
oo
d 
Tr
af
fic
 
 
Optimal Attackers Tier
Optimal DP (50 Filters)
Optimal DP (70 Filters)
Optimal GW Tier
Heuristic  (50 Filters)
Heuristic (70 Filters)
Figure 13: Modified Zombie scenario to reflect si-
multaneous increase in attack traffic (DDoS) as well
as in legitimate traffic (Flash Crowd).
heuristics. The heuristic is simulated for the same scenar-
ios we looked at for the optimal solution. In Fig.13, we
presented the scenario for the combined zombie and flash
crowd scenario. Together with the optimal solutions, shown
in solid lines, we also show the performance of the simple
heuristic in dashed lines. The heuristic is within the bounds
and relatively close to the optimal for 70 filters; however its
performance degrades fast with decreasing number of filters.
Given the low complexity of this simple heuristic, we are
now able to simulate scenarios for a much larger number of
attacks, which was prohibitively slow in simulation for the
optimal solution. Fig.14 shows the results for 1000-10000
nodes for the combined DDos+flash crowd scenario. Similar
trends hold as we saw before: the performance degrades and
the number of required filters vary at similar rates as before.
The heuristic we explored is clearly preliminary and serve
just as a proof of concept. We are currently working on im-
proving the heuristic (i) based on the intuition we obtained
from the structural properties of the optimal solution and
(ii) taking into account the attack traffic distribution.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of single-tier and two-
tier filtering against a DDoS attack as a resource optimiza-
tion problem. The purpose of filtering is to filter out indi-
vidual attackers, or entire gateways, so as to maximize the
amount of good traffic preserved, subject to constraints on
the number of filters and the total available bandwidth. We
formulated and solved the first problem as an optimization
problem and showed the reduction to a well known knap-
sack problem. For the second problem which is a nonlinear
optimization problem with non-linear constraints we showed
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Figure 14: Modified Zombie scenario for
DDoS+Flash Crowd, for large number of nodes.
how to solve it optimally in a dynamic programming frame-
work and we simulated the optimal solution using realistic
attack scenarios. We showed through simulations that the
optimal filtering policy can bring significant improvement
over any other policy in terms of preserved good traffic and
number of filters used. We also developed a simple heuristic
for the multi-tier scenario and showed that it performs well
under realistic attack scenarios. During our simulation we
have constructed models of a DDoS attack based on analysis
of worm infection and showed that the optimal filtering can
successfully mitigate such attack schemes. We are currently
working on developing efficient heuristics to achieve near-
optimal solution at lower complexity. We believe that filter
optimization is both important, to enable DDoS mitigation
with today’s mechanisms, and an interesting problem in it-
self. This work serves as a quantitative upper bound of using
filtering mechanisms to mitigate DDoS because it uses the
optimal policy to filter attack traffic. Such a quantitative
study of filtering is missing from the DDoS literature and
is an essential step towards successfully mitigating DDoS
attacks. One downside of filtering is that although we as-
sumed perfect attack detection which is ideal, sometimes
even optimal filtering will incur collateral damage to legit-
imate traffic. We are currently addressing the issue of im-
perfect attack identification and evaluating the performance
of optimal filtering under such conditions.
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